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Abstract
In this paper we study endogenous formation of communication networks in
situations where the economic possibilities of groups of players can be described
by a cooperative game. We concentrate on the influence that the existence of costs
for establishing communication links has on the communication networks that are
formed. The starting points in this paper are two game-theoretic models of the
formation of communication links that were studied in the literature fairly recently,
the extensive-form model by Aumann and Myerson (1988) and the strategic-form
model that was studied by Dutta, van den Nouweland and Tijs (1998). We follow
their analyses as closely as possible and use an extension of the Myerson value to
determine the payoffs to the players in communication situations when forming
links is not costless. We find that for both models, the pattern of structures
formed as costs increase depends on whether the underlying coalitional game is
superadditive and/or convex.
1 Introduction
In this paper we study endogenous formation of communication networks in situations
where the economic possibilities of groups of players can be described by a coopera-
tive game. We concentrate on the influence that the existence of costs for establishing
communication links has on the communication networks that are formed. The starting
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points of this paper are two game-theoretic models of the formation of communication
links that were studied in the literature fairly recently, the extensive-form model by
Aumann and Myerson (1988) and the strategic-form model studied by Dutta, van den
Nouweland and Tijs (1998).1 In both of these papers forming communication links is
costless and, once a communication network has been formed, an external allocation rule
is used to determine the payoffs to the players in different communication networks. The
external allocation rule used by Aumann and Myerson (1988) is the Myerson value (cf.
Myerson (1977)) and Dutta, van den Nouweland and Tijs (1998) considered a class of
external allocation rules that contains the Myerson value. We follow their analyses as
closely as possible and use a natural extension of the Myerson value to determine the
payoffs to the players in communication situations with costs for establishing links.
The goal of this paper is to study the influence that costs of forming communication
links have on the structures that are formed. In order to be able to clearly isolate
the influence of the costs, we assume that costs are equal for all possible communication
links. Starting from costs equal to zero, we increase the costs and see how these increasing
costs induce different equilibrium communication structures. Throughout the paper, we
almost always restrict our analysis to situations in which the underlying cooperative
games are 3-player symmetric games.
In the extensive-form game of link formation we consider communication structures
that are formed in subgame perfect Nash equilibria. We find that for this game, the pat-
tern of structures formed as costs increase depends on whether the underlying coalitional
game is superadditive and/or convex. We find that in case the underlying game is not
superadditive or in case it is convex, increasing costs for forming communication links
result in the formation of fewer links in equilibrium. However, if the underlying game
is superadditive but not convex, then increasing costs initially lead to the formation of
fewer links, then to the formation of more links, and finally lead to the formation of
fewer links again.
For the strategic-form game of link formation we briefly discuss the inappropriateness
of Nash equilibria and strong Nash equilibria and then consider coalition-proof Nash
equilibria. We find that for this game the pattern of structures formed as costs increase
also depends on whether the underlying coalitional game is superadditive and/or convex.
In contrast to the results for the extensive-from game of link formation, we find that in
all cases increasing costs for forming communication links result in the formation of fewer
links in equilibrium. We restrict our analysis of the formation of networks to symmetric
1The model studied by Dutta, van den Nouweland and Tijs (1998) was actually first mentioned in
Myerson (1991).
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3-player games for reasons of clarity of exposition, but we prove the existence of coalition-
proof Nash equilibria for 3-players games in general to show that the analysis using the
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium concept can be extended to such games.
The importance of network structures in the organization of many economic rela-
tionships has been extensively documented (see e.g. the references in Goyal (1993)
and Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)). The game-theoretic literature on communication
networks was initiated by Myerson (1977), who studied the influence of restrictions in
communication on the allocation of the coalitional values in TU-games. The influence
of the presence of communication restrictions on cooperative games has been studied by
many authors since and an extensive survey on this subject can be found in van den
Nouweland (1993).
In the current paper we study the formation of communication networks. Formally,
a communication network (cf. Myerson (1977)) is a graph in which the players are the
nodes and in which two players are connected by a communication link (an edge in the
graph) if and only if they can communicate with each other in a direct and meaningful
way. The game theoretic literature on the formation of communication networks includes
a number of papers, including Aumann and Myerson (1988), Goyal (1993), Dutta and
Mutuswami (1997), Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Watts (1997), Bala and Goyal (1998),
Dutta, van den Nouweland and Tijs (1998), and Slikker and van den Nouweland (1998).
The current paper is most closely related to Aumann and Myerson (1988) and Dutta,
van den Nouweland and Tijs (1998). Both of these two papers study the formation of
communication links in situations where the economic possibilities of the players can be
described by a cooperative game. It is the models in these two papers that we use to
study the formation of communication links in the current paper. However, in these two
papers establishing communication links is costless, whereas we impose costs for forming
communication links.
To our knowledge, the formation of communication networks when there are costs
for forming communication links has only been studied in specific parametric models, as
is the case in Goyal (1993), Watts (1997), Bala and Goyal (1998), and some examples
in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). The first three of these papers study the formation of
networks within the framework of a simple parametric model of information transmission.
These papers employ different processes of network formation and study the efficiency
and stability of networks. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) do not specify a specific model of
network formation, but they study the stability and efficiency of networks in situations
where self-interested agents can form and sever links. In their paper, a value function
gives the value of each possible network and an exogenously given allocation rule is used
4
to determine the payoffs to individual players for each possible network structure. They
show that for anonymous and component balanced allocation rules efficient graphs need
not be stable. The value function used by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) allows for costs
of communication links to be incorporated in the model in an indirect way.
Our paper differs from Goyal (1993), Watts (1997), and Bala and Goyal (1998) in
the sense that we do not restrict ourselves to a specific parametric model. On the other
hand, it is less general than Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) because, following Aumann and
Myerson (1988) and Dutta, van den Nouweland and Tijs (1998), we restrict ourselves
to situations in which the economic possibilities of the players can be described by a
coalitional game. However, we explicitly model the costs of establishing communication
links, rather than having those implicit in the value function. This allows us to study
the influence of these costs.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we provide general definitions
concerning communication situations and allocation rules. In section 3 we compute the
payoffs allocated to the players in different communication situations according to the
extension of the Myerson value that we use as the external allocation rule in this paper.
We describe and study the linking game in extensive form in section 4 and section 5
contains our study of the linking game in strategic form. We conclude in section 6.
2 Communication situations
In this section we will describe communication situations and an allocation rule for these
situations, the Myerson value. Additionally, we will introduce communication costs and
describe how these costs will be divided between the players.
A communication situation (N, v, L) consists of a cooperative game (N, v), describing
the economic possibilities of all coalitions of players, and a communication graph (N,L),
which describes the communication channels between the players. The characteristic
function v assigns a value v(S) to all coalitions S ⊆ N , with v(∅) = 0. We will restrict
ourselves to zero-normalized non-negative games, i.e. v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N and
v(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N . Communication is two-way and is represented by an undirected
communication graph, i.e. the set of links L is a subset of L̄ := {{i, j} | {i, j} ⊆
N, i 6= j}. The communication graph (N,L) should be interpreted as a way to model
restricted cooperation between the players. Players can only cooperate with each other
if they are directly connected with each other, i.e. there is a link between them, or if
they are indirectly connected, i.e. there is a path via other players that connects them.
Note that indirect communication between two players requires the cooperation of the
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players on a connecting path between them as well. The communication structure (N,L)
gives rise to a partition of the player set into groups of players who can communicate
with each other. Two players belong to the same partition element if and only if they
are connected with each other, directly or indirectly. A partition element is called a
communication component and the set of communication components is denoted N/L.
The communication graph (N,L) also induces a partition of each coalition S ⊆ N . 2
This partition is denoted by S/L and it consists of the communication components of
the subgraph (S, L(S)), where L(S) contains the communication links within S, i.e.
L(S) := {{i, j} ∈ L | {i, j} ⊆ S}.
The restricted communication within a coalition S ⊆ N influences the economic
possibilities of the coalition. Cooperation between players in different communication
components is not possible, so benefits of cooperation can only be realized within commu-
nication components. We define the value of coalition S in the communication situation





The game (N, vL) is usually called the graph-restricted game. The Myerson value of
the communication situation (N, v, L) coincides with the Shapley value Φ (see Shapley
(1953)) of the graph-restricted game,
µ(N, v, L) = Φ(N, vL).
Myerson (1977) characterizes this rule using two properties, component balancedness
and fairness.3 Component balancedness states that the players in a communication
component C divide the value of this communication component, v(C), between them.
Fairness states that the addition (deletion) of a link in a communication situation should
have the same cardinal effect on the two players that form this link.
In the description of the model above, it is assumed that there are no costs for
establishing communication links. In the following we will introduce such costs and
integrate these in the analysis of the communication situations described above.
We will assume that the formation of a communication link between any two players
results in a fixed cost c ≥ 0. A straightforward way to distribute these costs among the
two players is to divide them equally among the players who form the link. Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996) study value functions, functions that assign a value to all subsets
2S ⊆ N denotes that S is a subset of N , S ⊂ N denotes that S is a strict subset of N.
3Myerson (1977) refers to component balancedness as component efficiency. We prefer to use com-
ponent balancedness to avoid confusion with efficiency of graphs.
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of links. They show that there is a unique fair and component balanced allocation rule
for these situations. This allocation rule results in dividing the cost of each link equally
among the players who form it if the value function that describes the costs is considered,
i.e. the value function described by v(A) = c|A| for all A ⊆ L. So, if the philosophy
of the Myerson value is applied to divide the profits, then the payoff to player i ∈ N
in communication situation (N, v, L) will be the amount he would get according to the
Myerson value minus his share of the costs of establishing communication links. Denoting
the set of links player i is involved in by Li := {{i, j} | {i, j} ∈ L}, his payoff is
νi(N, v, L, c) := µi(N, v, L)−
1
2
|Li|c, for all i ∈ N.
We will refer to allocation rule ν as the cost-extended Myerson value. In the following
sections we will introduce costs of establishing communication links in two well-known
models of link formation, the model of link formation in extensive form introduced
by Aumann and Myerson (1988) and the model of link formation in strategic form
introduced by Myerson (1991). Throughout this paper we mostly restrict ourselves to
3-person cooperative games where the worth of a coalition only depends on how many
members it has and not on the identities of these members.
3 The cost-extended Myerson value for symmetric
3-player games
In this section we will compute the payoffs according to the cost-extended Myerson value
for symmetric 3-player games and all possible communication structures between the
three players of these games. Due to symmetry, we need to distinguish only 5 different
positions a player can have in a communication graph. We will analyze the preferences
of the players over these positions, depending on the underlying cooperative game and
the costs of establishing communication links.
Let (N, v) be a symmetric 3-player game, i.e. there exist w1,w2,w3 ∈ IR such that
v(S) = w|S| for all S ⊆ N with S 6= ∅, and let c denote the non-negative communication
costs.
In figure 1 on page 7 we distinguish 5 different positions in the set of graphs with
3 vertices. Position 1 is the isolated position. An isolated player receives zero payoff.4
Note that in the graph with one link, one of the players is isolated:
νi(N, v, ∅, c) = νi(N, v, {{j, k}}, c) = 0 if i 6∈ {j, k}. (1)


















Figure 1: Different positions
Position 2 denotes the linked position in a graph with one link. The two linked players
divide the value of a 2-person coalition and the costs,







Position 3 is the central position in the graph with two links. A player in this position
receives






w2 − c. (3)
Position 4 is the non-central position in the graph with two links. The payoff a player
in this position receives equals










Finally, position 5 represents a position in the graph with three links. In the graph with
three links, every player receives
νi(N, v, L̄, c) =
1
3
w3 − c. (5)
Obviously, depending on (N, v) and c a player will have different preferences over the
positions 1 through 5. The preferences of a player are described in table 1 on page 8.
If a condition in table 1 holds with equality then a player is indifferent between the
positions while a reverse preference holds if the reverse inequality holds. In the next
sections we will consider the influence of costs of establishing communication links in
link formation games.
4 Linking game in extensive form
In this section we will introduce a slightly modified version of the linking game in ex-
tensive form that was introduced and studied by Aumann and Myerson (1988). The
modification consists of the incorporation of costs of establishing communication links.
Subsequently, following Aumann and Myerson (1988), we will study the subgame per-
fect Nash equilibria (SPNE) in this model. We provide an example that illustrates some
curiosities that can arise and we also provide a systematic analysis of 3-player symmetric
games.
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Preference Condition independent of c Condition dependent on c
1  2 c > w2












1  5 c > 1
3
w3






2  4 2w2 > w3
2  5 c > 2
3
w3 −w2
3  4 c < w2
3  5 w2 > 0
4  5 c > 1
3
w2
Table 1: Preferences over different positions
4.1 The game
We will now describe a slightly modified version of the game in extensive form as it was
introduced by Aumann and Myerson (1988). A TU-cooperative game (N, v) and a cost
per link c are exogenously given and initially there are no communication links between
the players. According to some exogenously given rule of order pairs of players get the
opportunity to form a link. This link is actually formed if both players agree on forming
this link. If a link is formed, it cannot be broken in a further stage of the game. After
a pair of players have decided on whether or not to form a link, the next pair of players
who have not yet formed a link get the opportunity to do so. After the last pair of
players in the order have had the opportunity to form a link, the first pair of players in
the order who have not yet formed a link get a new opportunity to form the link between
them. The process stops when, after the last link that has formed, all pairs of players
that have not yet formed a link have had a final opportunity to do so and declined this
offer. This process results in a set of links. We will denote this set by L. The payoff
to the players is then determined by the cost-extended Myerson value, i.e. if (N,L) is
formed player i receives




In the original model of Aumann and Myerson (1988) there are no costs for links and
player i receives µi(N, v, L).
Aumann and Myerson (1988) already noted that the order in which two players in a
pair decide whether or not to form a link has no influence. Furthermore, since the game
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is of perfect information it has subgame perfect Nash equilibria (see Selten (1965)).
4.2 An example
In this section we will consider the 3-player symmetric game (N, v) with
v(S) :=

0 if |S| ≤ 1
60 if |S| = 2
72 if S = N
. (6)
This game was analyzed by Aumann and Myerson (1988) who showed that in the absence
of costs of establishing communication links every subgame perfect Nash equilibrium re-
sults in the formation of exactly one link. We will analyze the influence of link formation
costs on the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the model. The payoffs for the four
classes of structures that can result follow directly from section 3. It holds that
νi(N, v, ∅, c) = 0 for all i ∈ N.
If one link results, the two players forming this link equally divide the value of a two-
player coalition and the cost of the link:
νi(N, v, {{j, k}}, c) = 0;
νj(N, v, {{j, k}}, c) = 30− 12c.
In case two links form, the payoffs are
νj(N, v, {{i, j}, {j, k}}, c) = 44− c;




Finally, if all three links are formed all players receive the same payoff,
νi(N, v, L̄, c) = 24− c for all i ∈ N.
Aumann and Myerson (1988) study this example with c = 0. If two players, say i
and j, form a link, they will each receive a payoff of 30. Certainly, both would prefer
to form a link with the remaining player k, provided the other player does not form a
link with player k, and receive 44. However, if player i forms a link with player k he can
anticipate that subsequently players j and k will also form a link to get 24 rather than
14. So, both players i and j know that if one of them forms a link with player k they
will end up with a payoff of 24, which is strictly less than 30, the payoff they receive
if only the link between players i and j is formed. Hence, every subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium results in the formation of exactly one link.
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What will happen if establishing a communication link with another player is not
free any more? One would expect that relatively small costs will not have very much
influence and that larger costs will result in the formation of fewer links.
For small costs, say c = 1, we can repeat the discussion above and conclude that
exactly one link will form. However, if the costs are larger the analysis changes. Assume
for example that c = 22. Then, forming one link will result in a payoff of 19 for the
two players forming the link, and the remaining player will receive 0. Forming two links
will give the central player 22 and the other two players will receive 3 each. Finally,
the full cooperation structure will give all players a payoff 2. We see that this changes
the incentives of the players. Once two links are formed, the two players that are not
linked with each other yet, prefer to stay in the current situation and receive 3 instead
of forming a link and receive only 2. In case one link has been formed, a player who
is already linked is now willing to form a link with the isolated player since this would
increase his payoff (from 19 to 22) and the threat of ending up in the full cooperation
structure has disappeared. Obviously, all players prefer forming some links to no link
at all. Similar to the argument that in the absence of costs all three stuctures with one
link are supported by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (see Aumann and Myerson
(1988)), it follows that with communication costs equal to 22 all three structures with
two links are supported by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
The surprising result in this example is that an increase in the costs of establishing a
communication link results in more communication between the players (2 links rather
than 1). In the following subsection we will again see this result. We will also show that
a further increase in the costs will result in a decrease in the number of links between
the players.
4.3 Symmetric 3-player games
In this subsection we will describe the communication graphs that will result in 3-player
symmetric games and with various levels of costs. The payoffs and preferences of the
players can be found in section 3.
We will distinguish three classes of games that result in different communication
structure patterns with changing costs of establishing communication links. First, as-
sume that the game (N, v) satisfies w2 > w3. Then, combining the inequalities in table
1 we find the structures that are supported by subgame perfect Nash equilibria as a





Figure 2: Communication structures according to SPNE in case w2 > w3
We note that on the boundary, i.e. c = w2, both structures that appear for c < w2 and
for c > w2 are supported by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. If w2 > w3 the full
communication structure, in which all players are connected directly, will never form.
Checking the preferences of the players, we see that the full communication structure
would be formed only if c < 2
3
w3−w2. Since 23w3−w2 < 0 and since costs of establishing
a communication link are non-negative the full cooperation structure will not be formed.
Secondly, assume the game (N, v) satisfies 2w2 > w3 > w2. The structures resulting
















w3 − 13w2 w2
Figure 3: Communication structures according to SPNE in case 2w2 > w3 > w2
The example in subsection 4.2 belongs to this class of games. In that example 2
3
w3−w2 <
0. Since the condition 2w2 > w3 > w2 can result in
2
3
w3−w2 < 0 but also in 23w3−w2 > 0,
we have not explicitly indicated c = 0 in figure 3.
Thirdly, consider the class of games satisfying w3 > 2w2. For these games the struc-
tures supported by subgame perfect Nash equilibria are summarized in figure 4 on page
12.
The discussion above makes a distinction between three classes of games. Note that
if w2 = w3 then figures 2 and 3 lead to the same results since some of the boundaries
coincide. If w3 = 2w2 then figures 3 and 4 lead to the same results.
The communication structure patterns above result in three classes of games. The





















Figure 4: Communication structures according to SPNE in case w3 > 2w2
second class, defined by 2w2 > w3 > w2, contains only superadditive games that are not
convex. The last class, with w3 > 2w2, contains only convex games.
We conclude that for non-superadditive games and for convex games increasing costs
of establishing communication links results in a decreasing number of communication
links, while for superadditive non-convex games increasing costs can result in more com-
munication links.
5 Linking game in strategic form
In this section we will introduce costs of establishing communication links in the link for-
mation game in strategic form that was introduced by Myerson (1991) and subsequently
studied by Qin (1996), Dutta, van den Nouweland, and Tijs (1998), and Slikker (1998).
We will analyze this model by means of the Nash equilibrium, strong Nash equilibrium,
and coalition proof Nash equilibrium concepts.
5.1 The game
Let (N, v) be a cooperative game and c an exogenously given cost per link. The link
formation game Γ(N, v, c, ν) is described by the tuple (N ; (Si)i∈N ; (fνi )i∈N). For each
player i ∈ N the set Si = 2N\{i} is the strategy set of player i. A strategy of player i is
an announcement of the set of players he wants to form communication links with. A
communication link between two players will form if and only if both players want to
form the link. The set of links that form according to strategy profile s ∈ S =
∏
i∈N Si
will be denoted by
L(s) := {{i, j} ⊆ N | i ∈ sj , j ∈ si}.
The payoff function fν = (fνi )i∈N is defined as the allocation rule ν, the cost-extended
Myerson value, applied to (N, v, L(s), c),
fν(s) = ν(N, v, L(s), c).
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In the original model of Myerson (1991) the players receive µ(N, v, L) = ν(N, v, L, 0).
Dutta, van den Nouweland, and Tijs (1998) study the undominated Nash and coalition
proof Nash equilibria in this game. They show that in superadditive games the full
communication structure will form or a structure that is payoff equivalent to it. Slikker
(1998) shows a similar result for (strictly) perfect and (weakly/strictly) proper equilibria.
5.2 Nash equilibria and Strong Nash equilibria
In this section we study Nash equilibria and strong Nash equilibria. We present an
example showing that many communication structures can result from Nash equilibria,
while strong Nash equilibria do not always exist.
Recall that a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if there is no player who can
increase his payoff by unilaterally deviating from it. A strategy profile is called a strong
Nash equilibrium if there is no coalition of players that can strictly increase the payoffs
of all its members by a joint deviation (Aumann (1959)).
Consider the following example. Let (N, v) be the symmetric 3-player game with
v(S) :=

0 if |S| ≤ 1
30 if |S| = 2
48 if S = N
. (7)
The payoffs to the players for the five positions we distinguished in figure 1 are summa-











Table 2: Payoffs in different positions
If c = 0 every structure can be supported by a Nash equilibrium, since nobody wants
to break a link and two players are needed to form a link.5 If costs rise, fewer structures
are supported by Nash equilibria. However, since a communication link can only be
formed if two players want to do so, the communication structure with zero links is
always supported by a Nash equilibrium.
5This was already proven for all superadditive games by Dutta, van den Nouweland, and Tijs (1998).
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Since Nash equilibria can result in a fairly large set of structures, we consider the
refinement to strong Nash equilibria for this game. Suppose that the costs per link are
10. We will show that no strong Nash equilibrium exists by considering all possible
communication structures. First the communication structures with zero and three links
cannot result from a strong Nash equilibrium since two players can deviate to a strategy
profile resulting in only the link between them, improving their payoffs from 0 or 6 to
10. A structure with two links is not supported by a strong Nash equilibrium since the
two players in the non-central positions can deviate to a strategy profile resulting in only
the link between them and improve their payoffs from 6 to 10. Finally, a communication
structure with one link is not supported by a strong Nash equilibrium since one player
in a linked position and the player in the non-linked position can deviate to a strategy
profile resulting in an additional link between them, increasing both their payoffs by 6.
We conclude that strong Nash equilibria do not always exist.6
5.3 Coalition proof Nash equilibria
The multiplicity of structures resulting from Nash equilibria and the non-existence of
strong Nash equilibria for many communication situations with costs for establishing
communication links inspires us to consider an intermediate concept, coalition proof
Nash equilibria. After giving the definition of coalition proof Nash equilibria, we first
study an example and then continue with general 3-player symmetric games. We also
show that coalition proof Nash equilibria always exist for 3-player games.
Before we can define the concept of coalition proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) we will
introduce some notation. Let (N, (Si)i∈N , (fi)i∈N ) be a game in strategic form. For every
T ⊂ N and ŝN\T ∈ SN\T , let Γ(ŝN\T ) be the game induced on the players of T by the
strategies ŝN\T , so
Γ(ŝN\T ) = (T, (Si)i∈T , (f
∗
i )i∈T )
where for all i ∈ T , f∗i : ST → IR is given by f
∗
i (s
T ) := fi(sT , ŝN\T ) for all sT ∈ ST .
Now, coalition proof Nash equilibria are defined inductively. In a one-player game
with player set N = {i}, ŝi ∈ S = Si is a CPNE of Γ = ({i}, Si, fi) if ŝi maximizes fi over
Si. Let Γ be a game with n > 1 players. Assume that coalition proof Nash equilibria
have been defined for games with less than n players. Then a strategy profile ŝ ∈ SN is
called self-enforcing if for all T ⊂ N , ŝT is a CPNE of Γ(ŝN\T ). Now, the strategy vector
ŝ is a CPNE of Γ if ŝ is self-enforcing and there is no other self-enforcing strategy profile
s ∈ SN with fi(s) > fi(ŝ) for all i ∈ N .
6Dutta et al. (1998) already note that in case c = 0 strong Nash equilibria might not exist.
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The set of coalition proof Nash equilibria is a superset of the set of strong Nash equi-
libria. The strong Nash equilibrium concept demands that no coalition can deviate to
a profile that strictly improves the payoffs of all players in the coalition. The coalition
proof Nash equilibrium concept has similar requirements, but the set of allowed devi-
ations is restricted. Every player in the deviating coalition should strictly improve his
payoff and the strategy profile of the deviating players should be stable with respect to
further deviations by subcoalitions.
5.3.1 CPNE in the linking game in strategic form
We start with an example to illustrate coalition proof Nash equilibria in the link for-
mation game in strategic form. Consider the 3-player symmetric game (N, v) studied in
subsection 4.2. Note that the payoffs to the players in the four classes of structures are
also listed in that subsection.
If c = 0, it follows from Dutta, van den Nouweland, and Tijs (1998) that the full
communication structure (with 3 links) is formed in the unique coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium of the linking game in strategic form. To understand this, we consider the
four classes of structures one-by-one. First note that the players would unilaterally like
to form any additional links they can, which implies that in a Nash equilibrium s there
can be no two players i and j such that i ∈ sj and j 6∈ si.
Hence, the structure with no links can only be formed in a Nash equilibrium if all 3
players state that they do not want to communicate with any of the other players, i.e.
si = sj = sk = ∅. This strategy is not a CPNE, because two players i and j can deviate
to ti = {j} and tj = {i} and form the link between them to get 30 rather than 0 and
then neither one of these players wants to deviate further.
A structure with one link, say link {i, j}, can only be formed in a Nash equilibrium
if si = {j}, sj = {i}, and sk = ∅. But players i and k have an incentive to deviate to
the strategies ti = {j, k} and tk = {i} and form an additional link. This will give player
i 44 rather than 30 and player k 14 rather than 0 and neither i nor k wants to deviate
further because they do not want to break links and they cannot form new links. This
shows that a structure with one link will not be formed in a CPNE.
In a Nash equilibrium, a structure with two links, say {i, j} and {j, k}, can only be
formed if si = {j}, sj = {i, k}, and sk = {j}. But players i and k have an incentive to
deviate to the strategies ti = {j, k} and tk = {i, j} and form an additional link, so that
they will each get 24 rather than 14. They will not want to deviate further, since this
can only involve breaking links.
So, the only structure that can possibly be supported by a CPNE is the full commu-
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nication structure. Suppose si = {j, k}, sj = {i, k}, and sk = {i, j}. The only deviations
from these strategies that give all deviating players a higher payoff, are deviations by two
players who break the links with the third player and induce the structure with only the
link between themselves. Suppose players i and j deviate to the strategies ti = {j} and
tj = {i} which will give both players 30 rather than 24. Then player i has an incentive
to deviate further to ui = {j, k}, in which case links {i, j} and {i, k} will be formed and
player i will get 44 instead of 30. This shows that deviations from s by two players are
not stable against further deviations by subcoalitions of the deviating coalition. Hence,
s is a CPNE.
What will happen in this example if establishing communication links is not costless?
Of course, for small costs, there will only be minor changes to the discussion above and
the conclusion will be unchanged. But if the costs are larger, then some of the deviations
that were previously taken into consideration will no longer be attractive. Suppose for
instance that c = 24. Then all players will prefer a structure with two links above the
structure with three links, in which they all get 0. In a structure with two links, no
player wants to break any links, since this will reduce his or her payoff by 2. Hence, for
these costs, exactly two links will be formed in a CPNE.
We now continue with the description of coalition proof Nash equilibria in symmetric
3-player games. Table 3 provides an overview of coalition proof Nash equilibria depending
on the position a player prefers most.
Most preferred position Additional condition Structure resulting from CPNE
1 0 links
2 1 link
3 5  4 3 links
3 4  5 2 links
4 ν3(N, v, L, c) > 0 2 links
4 ν3(N, v, L, c) < 0 0 links
5 3 links
Table 3: Coalition proof Nash equilibria depending on preferences of the players
This table can be used to determine the coalition proof Nash equilibria for the three
classes of games we distinguished in subsection 4.3. The following figures describe the
communication structures resulting from coalition proof Nash equilibria. Figure 5 on
page 17 describes the structures resulting from CPNE for the class of games containing
only non-superadditive games, figure 6 on page 17 is for the class of games containing
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only superadditive but non-convex games, and figure 7 deals with the class of games






















































Figure 7: Communication structures according to CPNE in case w3 > 2w2
5.3.2 Comparison to the linking game in extensive form
Comparing figures 2, 3, and 4 to figures 5, 6, and 7, respectively, we find that the
predictions according to SPNE in the extensive-form model and those according to CPNE
in the strategic-form model are remarkably similar.
For a class containing only convex games (w3 > 2w2), both models generate exactly
the same predictions (see figures 4 and 7).
18
For non-superadditive games, we get almost the same predictions. The only difference
between figures 2 and 5 is that the level of costs that marks the transition form the full






the extensive-form model, whereas it is negative (2
3
w3−w2) in the strategic-form model.7
The predictions of both models are most dissimilar for a class containing only su-
peradditive non-convex games (2w2 > w3 > w2). In the extensive-form model we get
a structure with one link in case 2
3
w3 − w2 < c <
1
3
w2 (see figure 3), whereas in the
strategic-form model for these costs we get the full communication structure (see figure
6). For lower costs we find the full communication structure for both models.
5.3.3 Existence of CPNE in general 3-player games
This subsection is devoted to the existence of CPNE for general 3-player games. Hence,
we extend the scope of our investigation beyond symmetric games. We do, however,
still restrict ourselves to zero-normalized non-negative games. For convenience, we will
assume (without loss of generality) that
v({1, 2}) ≥ v({1, 3}) ≥ v({2, 3}).
Throughout the rest of this section we call a deviation by a coalition profitable if it
strictly improves the payoffs of all deviating players. A deviation is called stable if the
deviation is a coalition proof Nash equilibrium in the subgame induced on the coalition
of deviating players by the strategies of the other players, i.e. a deviation from strategy
profile s by coalition T is stable if it is a CPNE in the game Γ(sN\T ) as defined on page
14. A deviation is called self-enforcing if this deviation is self-enforcing in the subgame
induced on the coalition of deviating players by the strategies of the other players, i.e.
a deviation from strategy profile s by coalition T is self-enforcing if it is self-enforcing in
the game Γ(sN\T )
The following lemmas will be used in the proof of existence of coalition proof Nash
equilibria in 3-player games.







v({1, 2}). Let s̄ be the strategy profile with s̄i = N\{i} for all i ∈ N which
results in the full communication structure. Let i, j ∈ N . Then the deviation from s̄ by
{i, j} given by (si, sj) = ({j}, {i}) is not stable.
7See the discussion of figure 2 on page 11.
19
Proof: We will show that there exists a further deviation of (si, sj) which is profitable
and stable, implying that (si, sj) is not stable. First, assume {i, j} = {1, 2}. Consider a
further deviation t1 = {2, 3} by player 1. Then8
















c = ν1({{1, 2}}) = f
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v({1, 2}). Since the strategy
space of a player is finite there exists a strategy of player 1 that maximizes his payoff,
given strategies (s2, s̄3) of players 2 and 3. This strategy is a profitable and stable
deviation from (s1, s2). We conclude that (s1, s2) is not stable.
Similarly, by considering t1 = {2, 3} we find that there exists a profitable and stable
further deviation if {i, j} = {1, 3} and considering t2 = {1, 3} implies that there exists
a profitable and stable further deviation if {i, j} = {2, 3}. In both cases we use that
v({1, 2}) ≥ v({1, 3}) ≥ v({2, 3}). 2
Lemma 5.2 Let Γ(N, v, c, ν) be a link formation game. Let s be a strategy profile. If
there exists a profitable and self-enforcing deviation from s by N , then the game has a
CPNE.
Proof: Suppose t1 is a deviation from s by N that is profitable and self-enforcing. Since
t1 is a self-enforcing deviation by N , there exists no profitable and stable deviation from
t1 by any S ⊂ N . If there is no profitable and self-enforcing deviation from t1 by N then
t1 is a CPNE. If t2 is a profitable and self-enforcing deviation from t1 by N , then
fν(t2) > fν(t1) > fν(s).
Repeat the process above to find a sequence (t1, t2, t3, . . .) such that tk is a profitable
and self-enforcing deviation from tk−1 for all k ≥ 2. It holds that
fν(t1) < fν(t2) < fν(t3) < . . . .
Since the strategy space of every player is finite this process has to end in finitely many
steps. The last strategy profile in the sequence is a CPNE. 2
We can now prove that coalition proof Nash equilibria exist in 3-player link formation
games in strategic form.
8If there is no ambiguity about (N, v, c) we simply write ν(L) instead of ν(N, v, L, c).
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Theorem 5.1 Let (N, v) be a 3-player cooperative game and let c ≥ 0 be the costs of
establishing a communication link. Then there exists a coalition proof Nash equilibrium
in the link formation game Γ(N, v, c, ν).
Proof: If (∅, ∅, ∅) is a CPNE we are done. From now on assume (∅, ∅, ∅) is not a CPNE.
Hence, there exists a profitable and stable deviation from (∅, ∅, ∅) by some T ⊂ N
or a profitable and self-enforcing deviation by N . If there exists a profitable and self-
enforcing deviation by N it follows by lemma 5.2 that we are done. So, from now on
assume there exists no profitable and self-enforcing deviation from (∅, ∅, ∅) by N . Hence
there exists a profitable and stable deviation from (∅, ∅, ∅) by some T ⊂ N . Since a
player cannot unilaterally enforce the formation of a link, we conclude that there exists
a profitable and stable deviation by a coalition with (exactly) two players.
So, there exists a profitable and stable deviation from (∅, ∅, ∅) by 2 players, say i
and j. The structures players i and j can enforce are the structure with no links and
the structure with link {i, j}. Since the structure with no links does not change their
payoffs, it follows that this profitable and stable deviation results in link {i, j}. This
deviation is profitable and stable iff v({i, j}) > c.9 Since, v({1, 2}) ≥ v({i, j}) > c it
follows that (s1, s2) = ({2}, {1}) is a profitable and stable deviation from (∅, ∅, ∅) and
that s = ({2}, {1}, ∅) is a Nash equilibrium. If s is a CPNE in the game Γ(N, v, c, ν) we
are done. So, from now on assume that s is not a CPNE.
Hence, there exists a profitable and stable deviation from s by some T ⊂ N or a
profitable and self-enforcing deviation by N . However, no profitable and self-enforcing
deviation by 3 players exists, since this would be a profitable and self-enforcing deviation
from (∅, ∅, ∅). Since s is a Nash equilibrium, we derive that there exists a profitable and
stable deviation by a coalition with (exactly) two players. Since coalition {1, 2} can only
break link {1, 2}, it follows that there exists a profitable and stable deviation from s by
coalition {1, 3} or by coalition {2, 3}. We will distinguish between these two cases.
CASE A: There exists a profitable and stable deviation from s by coalition {1, 3},
say (t1, t3). Since v({1, 2}) ≥ v({1, 3}) it follows that the deviation from s cannot result
in link {1, 3} alone, since this would not improve the payoff of player 1. Hence, the
deviation results in links {1, 2} and {1, 3}, the only two links that can be enforced by
players 1 and 3, given the strategy of player 2. Note that such a deviation is profitable











9We remind the reader that we restrict ourselves to zero-normalized games.
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So, inequality (8) must hold. Since a further deviation by player 1 or player 3 can
only result in breaking links, it follows that (t1, t3) = ({2, 3}, {1}) is a profitable and
stable deviation from s. Also, ν2({{1, 2}, {1, 3}}) ≥ ν3({{1, 2}, {1, 3}}) > 0, where the
weak inequality follows since v({1, 2}) ≥ v({1, 3}) and the strict inequality follows by
inequality (8). It follows that (t1, s2, t3) is a Nash equilibrium, since unilaterally player 2
can only break link {1, 2}. If (t1, s2, t3) is a CPNE in the game Γ(N, v, c, ν) we are done.
From now on assume (t1, s2, t3) is not a CPNE.
Since coalitions {1, 2} and {1, 3} cannot enforce an additional link, they cannot
make a profitable and stable deviation from (t1, s2, t3). There exists no profitable and
self-enforcing deviation by N from (t1, s2, t3) since this would be a profitable and self-
enforcing deviation from (∅, ∅, ∅). So, there exists a profitable and stable deviation from
(t1, s2, t3) by coalition {2, 3}, say (u2, u3). Since both players receive a positive payoff
according to (t1, s2, t3), any profitable deviation results in at least the formation of link
{2, 3}. Since player 3 receives at least as much in the structure with links {1, 2} and
{1, 3} as in the structure with links {1, 2} and {2, 3} this last structure will not form
after deviation (u2, u3). Similarly, since player 2 receives at least as much in the struc-
ture with links {1, 2} and {1, 3} as in the structure with links {1, 3} and {2, 3} this last
structure will not form after deviation (u2, u3). Finally, player 2 prefers the communica-












where the inequality follows from inequality (8) and v({1, 2}) ≥ v({1, 3}) ≥ v({2, 3}).
So, the deviation by players 2 and 3 to the communication structure with link {2, 3}
alone will not be stable. We conclude that t1 and deviation (u2, u3) together result in
the full communication structure. We will show that (t1, u2, u3) is a CPNE in the game
Γ(N, v, c, ν). The deviation (u2, u3) from (t1, s2, t3) is profitable iff v({2, 3}) > 3c. But,
if v({2, 3}) > 3c there is no profitable deviation from (t1, u2, u3) to a structure with two
links since v({1, 2}) ≥ v({1, 3}) ≥ v({2, 3}) > 3c. By lemma 5.1 and inequality (8) it
follows that there is no profitable and stable deviation from (t1, u2, u3) to a structure with
one link. Since v({1, 2}) ≥ v({1, 3}) ≥ v({2, 3}) > 3c > 0 it follows that a deviation to
the communication structure with no links cannot be stable. We conclude that (t1, u2, u3)
is a CPNE, showing the existence of a CPNE in the game Γ(N, v, c, ν) in CASE A.
CASE B: There exists a profitable and stable deviation from s by coalition {2, 3}, say
(t2, t3). Since v({1, 2}) ≥ v({2, 3}) it follows that the deviation from s cannot result in
link {2, 3} alone. Hence, the deviation results in links {1, 2} and {2, 3}, the only two
links that can be enforced by players 2 and 3, given the strategy of player 1. Note that
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However, since v({2, 3}) ≤ v({1, 3}) it follows that inequality (9) implies inequality (8).
Hence, there exists a profitable and stable deviation from s by coalition {1, 3}. Then
CASE A applies and we conclude that a CPNE in the game Γ(N, v, c, ν) exists.
This completes the proof of the theorem. 2
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we explicitly studied the influence of costs for establishing communi-
cation links on the communication structures that are formed in situations where the
underlying economic possibilities of the players are given by a cooperative game. To
do so, we considered two existing models of the formation of communication networks,
the extensive-form model of Aumann and Myerson (1988) and the strategic-form model
studied by Dutta, van den Nouweland and Tijs (1998). For these models, we studied
how the communication networks that are formed change as the costs for establishing
links increase. In order to be able to isolate the influence of the costs, we assumed
that costs are equal for all possible communication links. We restricted our analysis to
3-player symmetric games because our proofs involve explicit computations and this of
course puts severe restrictions on the type of situations that we can analyze while not
loosing ourselves and the readers in complicated notation. The proof of the existence of
coalition-proof Nash equilibria in the strategic-form game of link formation for general
3-players games provides a glimpse of the type difficulties that we would have to deal
with if we extended our analysis beyond symmetric games.
In the extensive-form game of link formation of Aumann and Myerson (1988), we
considered communication structures that are formed in subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
We find that for this game, the pattern of structures formed as costs increase depends
on whether the underlying coalitional game is superadditive and/or convex. In case the
underlying game is not superadditive or in case it is convex, increasing costs for forming
communication links result in the formation of fewer links in equilibrium. However, if
the underlying game is superadditive but not convex, then increasing costs initially lead
to the formation of fewer links, then to the formation of more links, and finally lead
to the formation of fewer links again. This is, in our view, the most surprising result
of the paper. It shows that subsidizing the formation of links does not necessarily lead
to more links being formed. Hence, authorities wishing to promote more cooperation
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cannot always rely on subsidies to accomplish this goal. In fact, such subsidies might
have an adverse effect.
For the strategic-form game of link formation studied by Dutta, van den Nouweland
and Tijs (1998) we briefly discussed the inappropriateness of Nash equilibria and strong
Nash equilibria and went on to consider coalition-proof Nash equilibria. We find that for
this game the pattern of structures formed as costs increase also depends on whether the
underlying coalitional game is superadditive and/or convex. In contrast to the results
for the extensive-from game of link formation, we find that in the strategic-form model
in all cases increasing costs for forming communication links result in the formation of
fewer links in equilibrium. The discussion of subsection 5.3.2 shows that the results we
obtain for the two models are otherwise remarkably similar. Even though we restrict our
analysis of the formation of networks to symmetric 3-player games for reasons of clarity of
exposition, we prove the existence of coalition-proof Nash equilibria for 3-players games
in general to show that the analysis using the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium concept
can be extended to such games.
In order to follow the analyses in Aumann and Myerson (1988) and Dutta, van den
Nouweland and Tijs (1998) as closely as possible, we extended the Myerson value to
situations in which the formation of links is not costless. We did so in a manner that is
consistent with the philosophy of the Myerson value. The Myerson value was introduced
by Myerson (1977) as the unique allocation rule satisfying component balancedness and
fairness. Myerson’s analysis was restricted to situations in which the formation of com-
munication links is costless. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) note that Myerson’s result can
be extended to situations in which a value function describes the economic possibilities
of the players in different networks (see Jackson and Wolinsky, theorem 4 on page 65).
It seems reasonable to view the unique allocation rule for such situations that is com-
ponent balanced and fair as the natural extension of the Myerson value. Since costs for
forming links can be implicitly taken into account using value functions, this extension of
the Myerson value can be used to determine allocations when an underlying cooperative
game describes the economic possibilities of the players and in which there are costs for
forming links. It is this allocation rule that we use.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) establish that there is a conflict between efficiency
and stability if the allocation rule used is component balanced. Indeed, we see many
illustrations of this result in the current paper. For example, for the strategic-form model
of link formation we find in section 5.3 that for small costs all links will be formed.10
10For costs equal to zero, this follows directly from the results obtained by Dutta, van den Nouweland,
and Tijs (1998).
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This is clearly not efficient, because the (costly) third link does not allow the players to
obtain higher economic profits. Rather, building this costly link diminishes the profits of
the group of players as a whole. It is formed only because it influences the allocation of
payoffs among the players. The formation of two links in case the game is superadditive
(see figures 6 and 7) is promising in this respect. However, from an efficiency point of
view these should be formed if w3 − 2c > w2 − c, or c < w3 − w2, and the cutoffs in
figures 6 and 7 appear at different values for c.
7 References
Aumann, R. (1959). Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games. In:
Contributions to the theory of games IV (Eds. A. Tucker and R. Luce), Princeton
University Press, 287-324.
Aumann, R. and R. Myerson (1988). Endogenous formation of links between
players and coalitions: an application of the Shapley value. In: The Shapley value
(Ed. A. Roth), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 175-
191.
Bala, V. and S. Goyal (1998). Self-Organization in Communication Networks.
Working paper.
Dutta, B., A. van den Nouweland, and S. Tijs (1998). Link formation in
cooperative situations. International Journal of Game Theory 27, 245-256.
Dutta, B. and S. Mutuswami (1997). Stable Networks. Journal of Economic
Theory 76, 322-344.
Goyal, S. (1993). Sustainable Communication Networks. Discussion Paper TI 93-250,
Tinbergen Institute, Erasmus University, Rotterdam.
Jackson, M. and A. Wolinsky (1996). A Strategic Model of Social and Economic
Networks. Journal of Economic Theory 71, 44-74.
Myerson, R. (1977). Graphs and cooperation in games. Mathematics of Operations
Research 2, 225-229.
Myerson, R. (1991). Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
25
Qin, C. (1996). Endogenous formation of cooperation structures. Journal of Economic
Theory 69, 218-226.
Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische behandlung eines oligopolmodells mit nachfrage-
traegheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte staatswissenschaft 121, 301-324, 667-689.
Shapley, L. (1953). A value for n-person games. Contributions to the theory of
games II (Eds. A. Tucker and H. Kuhn), 307-317.
Slikker, M. (1998). A note on link formation. CentER Discussion Paper 9820,
Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands.
Slikker, M. and A. van den Nouweland (1998). A one-stage model of link for-
mation and payoff division. Working paper.
van den Nouweland, A. (1993). Games and graphs in economic situations. Ph. D.
Dissertation, Tilburg University Press, Tilburg, The Netherlands.
Watts, A. (1997). A Dynamic Model of Network Formation. Working paper.
